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Article
The Standard of Compensation for Takings
Mark A. Chinen*
I. INTRODUCTION
In international investment law there is a long-standing
debate about he proper standard of compensation for takings.
The first alternative is prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation: often interpreted as the fair market value of the
investment including expected profits. The second is appropriate
compensation: a value that can range from full compensation to
much less depending on the circumstances.
In order to assess this debate, this Article examines the
expected and actual behaviors of the main actors-the investor
and the host state-in investment transactions. After a brief
description of the two compensation standards in Part II, Part
III of this Article considers how a potential foreign investor and
host state would likely behave if the investment is viewed from
a business perspective. Before it decides to invest in a country,
the investor will assess political risks associated with the
project, including the chance the host state will take the
investment. If the investor believes the investment will be taken,
the investor will adjust for that risk. It will require a higher
return for its investment, take out insurance, invest less than it
would otherwise, or decline to invest altogether. All of these
actions represent some cost to the host state. If the investor
believes the investment is secure, it will not adjust to the same
degree. The point is not that one standard of compensation is
better than the other. Rather, a rational investor will always
adjust for the risk of loss to a greater or lesser extent, no matter
* Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like to thank my
colleague Sid DeLong and the participants in the October 2014 American
Society of International Law Midyear Meeting and Research Forum for their
comments and suggestions to earlier drafts. Bob Menanteaux, recently retired
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what is the standard of compensation. Further, the host state
almost always bears the cost of a taking irrespective of the
standard used, either directly by paying full compensation, or
indirectly because of the precautionary measures taken by an
investor if the compensation standard is lower or because the
investor decides not to invest at all.
Part III also examines the actual practice of investors.
Studies of investor decision making and risk analysis indicate
that pre-investment risk assessment varies. As part of their
capital budgeting, some firms engage in rather sophisticated
risk analysis when possible and adjust accordingly, but
sometimes because there is not enough information about a
potential host country, other firms perform a rough analysis of
potential political risks before deciding to invest, even though
they too take certain precautionary measures if they believe
such an investment is risky.
Part IV discusses some of the implications of this analysis
for standards of compensation. First, as discussed above, the
host state will eventually bear the cost of compensation of risk
adjustment measures, no matter what the standard of
compensation is. The issue for the host state is how it will
allocate and bear those costs.
Second, the investor will engage in some form of risk
assessment and management no matter what the standard is or
how the standard is embodied, whether it is in a contract, treaty,
or customary international norm. In the case of a negotiated
contract, the investor and host state can adjust their particular
risk tolerance levels. In the case of the investment contract or
the treaty, the standard of compensation acts like a guarantee
on the part of the host state to pay a certain amount if there is a
taking. But with treaties, investors do not directly negotiate
with host states, home states do. Since at the outset states do
not know whether they will be the respondent in an action
involving a taking, at first blush it would seem rational for states
not to expressly commit to giving full compensation. There might
be good reasons why a state would or would not commit in
advance to doing so; if, however, a state does not commit itself to
full compensation, it will incur costs as potential investors
account for a lower standard.
Third, the kind of taking will not matter to the investor.
Again, from the perspective of the host state or the international
community as a whole, there might be valid reasons for
distinguishing between legal and illegal takings. But from the
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investor's perspective, either form of taking represents a
reduction in the value of the asset, no matter how a particular
measure by the state is characterized. An investor would be
expected to take the same precautionary measures with respect
to either kind of taking-the costs of which will eventually be
borne by the host state.
Finally, the fact that an investor will take precautionary
measures prior to an investment in some circumstances and not
others has implications when the standard of compensation is
actually applied-particularly at the valuation stage when
investments are appraised and lost profits calculated. If there is
evidence that prior to an investment an investor did not care
about the risk of a taking, or if it did, had taken precautionary
measures, then full compensation might overcompensate the
investor. Conversely, an investor would be undercompensated if
there is evidence it did not take precautionary measures because
it reasonably believed the investment would not be taken or that
it would receive full compensation if it was. At the valuation
stage, the issue becomes what to do about the possible mismatch
between pre-investment risk assessment and the applicable
compensation standard post-taking. In part, this problem might
account for the inconsistency in awards among cases even when
the same standard is purportedly being applied.
II. COMPENSATION FOR TAKINGS
A state is required under international law to compensate a
foreign investor for taking an investment,1 as well as to make
reparations for breaches of international investment obligations.
Providing such compensation or reparations involves choosing a
standard of relief and then using a valuation method to
implement the standard chosen. I discuss the relevance of
valuation methods to the concerns of this Article more fully in
Part IV. This Part, however, is concerned with the standard of
compensation. Such standards are often detailed in investment
contracts and in the investment provisions of treaties, but the
interpretation of such provisions, as well as the determination of
1. The term is used interchangeably with confiscation, expropriation, and
nationalization of an investment. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 365 (3d ed. 2010). Here, I will use the term in that
way. As is well known, under the Calvo Doctrine, the taking of an investment
is purely a matter of domestic law so that there is no duty of compensation
under international law.
2016]
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remedies, often rely on customary norms.
The terminology is used somewhat inconsistently, but in
broad terms, two measures are urged for legal expropriations
(those done for a public purpose, without discrimination, and
with compensation) and for breaches of international norms. The
first and most commonly adopted measure is full compensation.
Full compensation is sometimes equated with the Hull formula
of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, and often
interpreted as the fair market value of the investment including
expected profits when appropriate.2 Supporters of this standard,
particularly when a breach is involved, cite language from
Chorzow Factory,3 which can be read to articulate this measure,
and from the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts.4 After Chorzow, the measure has
been used in a number of cases involving takings or breaches of
international law investment standards.
5
2. See NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 178 79 (2005) (arguing that the modern standard is full compensation,
which is equated to "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation).
3. ("The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act-a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in
particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed.") Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 3). The Chorzow tribunal reflects a long-accepted view of
the purpose of remedies: "to redress the wrong by creating the situation that
would have existed had the wrong not occurred." JAMES M. FISCHER,
UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 2 (2d ed. 2006).
4. Article 34 requires "full reparation" for injuries caused by an
internationally wrongful act. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the
International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 34,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility].
Compensation, a form of reparation, includes "any financially assessable
damage including loss of profits so far as this is established." Id. at art. 36(1).
See also Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712
cmt. d (1987) (stating that in the case of a taking, "[t]here must be payment for
the full value of the property, usually 'fair market value' where that can be
determined"). However, the comments acknowledge that there might be
exceptional circumstances, such as national agricultural reform, when some
"deviation" from the standard is permitted. Id.
5. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, 400 401, 404 (Sept. 28, 2007) (citing Chorzow and the Articles on State
Responsibility to award fair market value for breach of the fair and equitable
treatment obligation); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/05, Award, 275 93 (Nov. 21, 2007) (awarding lost profits for breach
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However, the payment of full compensation, if interpreted
as the full value of an investment, could prevent a state from
engaging in broad economic reform. Consequently, appropriate
compensation is urged as an alternate measure. Under that
standard, it might still be proper to pay full compensation for a
taking. M. Sornarajah, for example, argues that under most
circumstances, full compensation should be paid if a state takes
a relatively small, discrete business.6 However, there might be
circumstances when a state is engaged in the nationalization of
an economic sector, land reform, or indigenization programs
when less than full compensation will be paid.7 Proponents of
this standard point to certain General Assembly resolutions, the
Charter of Economic Rights, and the acceptance of less-than-
market-value lump sum payments for takings as evidence for
appropriate compensation as the norm.
8
This is a brief discussion of the doctrine and there are more
aspects of compensation, such as the possible distinction in
of NAFTA investment provisions based on a full compensation standard);
Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219,
225 (1984) (awarding the "full value" of property deprived by government).
6. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 448.
7. See id. at 448 49. See also Oscar Schachter, Compensation for
Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121, 127 30 (1984) (discussing when
appropriate compensation might be the proper standard).
8. See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources (Dec. 14, 1962) (stating that appropriate compensation should be
paid in the case of takings); G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources (Dec. 17, 1973) (affirming that each State is entitled to
determine the level of compensation to be paid); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 12, 1974) (providing that
appropriate compensation should be paid). For a discussion of lump sum
settlements, see 1 & 2 RICHARD B. LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS
(1975). The European Court of Human Rights follows this reasoning. See
Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 51 (1986)
("[L]egitimate objectives of 'public interest,' such as pursued in measures of
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call
for less than reimbursement of the full market value .. "); Stefan Kirchner &
Katarzyna Geler-Noch, Compensation Under the European Convention for
Human Rights for Expropriations Enforced Prior to the Applicability of the
Convention, 19 JURISPRUDENCIJA 21, 25 (2012); Ursula Kriebaum, Nationality
and the Protection of Property under the European Court of Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION 649, 654
57 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008). As discussed earlier, the terminology is
used loosely. For example, the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment call for appropriate compensation, but compensation
is appropriate if it is "adequate, effective and prompt," equal to the fair market
value of the business. WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 209 (1993) [hereinafter WORLD BANK GUIDELINES].
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remedies for legal and illegal takings, that will be discussed
more fully in Part IV. Here, it is enough to note that there is a
debate as to which standard should prevail under customary
international law. Much of the literature naturally centers on
whether either standard meets the requirements of a general
and consistent practice of states and opinio juris. Thus, there are
arguments about the relevance to custom of multilateral,
regional, and bilateral treaties, General Assembly resolutions,
past practices of states, the decisions of international courts and
arbitral tribunals, and the views of commentators.9 The reasons
why compensation should be paid and what standard should be
applied include the need to vindicate individual rights vis-A-vis
the general public to prevent unjust enrichment, to deter illegal
takings, and to encourage investment.10 Also at stake, though, is
a state's sovereignty over its natural resources and the right to
regulate its economy, development, and environment. By the
same token, a state has an interest in protecting its nationals
abroad, and by extension, its citizens' property.11
As Irmgard Marboe writes, an international practice has
developed without vindicating any of the several justifications
urged as a compensation requirement.1 2 Given these somewhat
competing interests, it is difficult to argue that one
compensation standard is better than the other, and one's
judgment often depends on whether that person is viewing the
issue from the perspective of the investor or of the host state.
Since investors and host states are the crucial parties in
investment activity, it is worth exploring what their respective
behaviors might add to the larger debate.
9. For a discussion of the debate, see SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN
WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 19 48 (2008)
(discussing the sources of international law on damages including customary
international law); RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 2, at 178 79 (arguing that
full compensation is the standard); SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 412 43
(arguing that full compensation is not the customary norm); Jos6 E. Alvarez, A
BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17 (2009) (discussing the
relationship between bilateral investment treaties and customary international
law).
10. IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 14 15 (2009).
11. See Part IV.
12. MARBOE, supra note 10, at 15.
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III. THE DECISION TO INVEST OR ALLOW
INVESTMENT
A. INVESTMENT AND RISK
Any firm must choose from various potential business
projects in which it will invest its capital, but faces the risk that
the project(s) it chooses will underperform. Presumably, before
making that choice, a firm will explicitly or implicitly undergo a
capital budgeting process through which it will compare a
project's potential earning power with that of others. Part of that
comparison will include an assessment of the risk that the
project will not perform as hoped. On balance, projects expected
to result in higher income with less risk will be chosen over those
expected to result in lower income or those in the same income
range but with higher risk. A firm might also choose to invest in
a riskier project but will require a greater return to make up for
the greater potential loss.
13
A firm considering investments in another country will
likely carry out the same budgeting process it would if the
investment were domestic. The categories often blur, but risks
are often divided roughly into market risk (sometimes termed
investment and commercial risk) and political risk. Market risk
includes challenges associated with any business, including the
potential for a drop in demand for a firm's products or services,
competition from other firms, and rising costs of labor and
inputs, et cetera. Sometimes these risks are quantified by
industry sector. Of course, such risks might be higher in a
foreign market because of factors such as unfamiliarity with the
local culture, foreign exchange risk, and possible hostility
towards a foreign investment.
Political risk involves government actions that could
prevent an investment from performing as anticipated, such as
the imposition of price controls, performance requirements,
taxation, and the taking of the investment itself. In the case of
foreign investment, there are also risks that a host state
government might prevent the repatriation of profits or in some
13. For introductions to corporate finance and the investment process, see
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND
VALUATION (2003); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, FINANCING AND
RISK MANAGEMENT (2003); ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE
FINANCE (3d ed. 2011); STEVEN PETERSON, INVESTMENT THEORY AND RISK
MANAGEMENT (2012).
2016]
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way discriminate against the foreign investor. Finally, there is
country risk, the risk associated with the relative stability of a
country-e.g., political unrest.
14
The host state undergoes a decision-making process of its
own. A host state seeks foreign investment because there is not
enough domestic capital to meet demand and because it seeks
the positive spillover effects of increased employment, training,
and technology that purportedly come from foreign
investment.1 5 A host state with no restrictions on foreign
investment has presumably decided that the market will
determine which projects will go forward within its jurisdiction
and which will not. But in many states, at least some sectors of
the economy are regulated or owned by the state. In determining
which of these sectors to open to foreign investment, and
certainly when deciding to undergo large-scale infrastructure
projects that almost always require some level of foreign
participation, the state must also choose between a number of
possible economic activities that offer benefits from the state's
perspective, but which also pose risks. Regarding foreign
investment, the state faces the risk that the foreign investment
projects will not yield the direct and indirect benefits that were
expected to result, sometimes due to the action or inaction of the
foreign investor.16
It is commonplace in economic theory, particularly in the
study of incomplete contracts, that if there were perfect
information and no transaction costs, the potential investor and
host state would be able to accurately assess the costs, benefits,
and risks associated with a proposed investment project. They
would then be able to structure the transaction to account for all
contingencies and allocate all risks between them. This would
14. For a discussion of the risks to foreign investors and the risk
assessment process, see RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 326;
SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 69 79.
15. This is a highly idealized account of investor and host state behavior.
Kate Miles tracks the interplay of politics, trade, and law in the development of
international investment law in KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL
(2013).
16. See generally TIMOTHY C. IRWIN, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES:
ALLOCATING AND VALUING RISK IN PRIVATELY FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS (2007) (discussing the risks to host states and their valuation in
connection with large-scale infrastructure projects). For simplicity, this Article
focuses mostly on pre-investment decision making at the initial stage. In
reality, firms and host states often make similar decisions throughout the life
of the investment project.
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also include accurately setting a price for the investment, as well
as determining the compensation that would be paid if one of the
parties does not meet its obligations to the project or to one
another, or harms the other in connection with the proposed
investment. There would likely be no discrepancy between the
ex ante evaluation of the project and the ex post results after the
project is completed, even if the project fails. And in the case of
failure to perform, there would be almost no chance of
undercompensation or overcompensation. Of course, real
investors and host states do not live in such a world.
B. INCOME PROJECTIONS, RISK EVALUATION, AND MITIGATION
1. The Investor
It is instructive to examine how actors behave when
information is imperfect and transaction costs exist. A potential
investor can account for various risks through financial
projections of a project's performance. There have been many
studies of the financial methods firms use when engaging in
capital budgeting or when contemplating investing abroad in
particular.17 As will be discussed in Part IV, such methods are
also important for purposes of this Article because they are often
used at the quantum stage of investment disputes.
Three methods appear to be widely used, although not
exclusively. The first is the net present value approach. Under
this method, the investor identifies all potential cash inflows and
outflows through the life of the project. It then determines a
discount rate, which is used to determine the present value of
17. See, e.g., John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, How Do CFOs Make
Capital Budgeting and Capital Structure Decisions?, 15 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8
(2002); John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of
Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000)
[hereinafter Graham & Harvey, Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance];
Patricia A. Ryan & Glenn P. Ryan, Capital Budgeting Practices of the Fortune
1000: How Have Things Changed?, 8 J. Bus. & MGMT. 335 (2002); Nico
Sykianakis, Risk Assessment and Management in FDIs: A Case Study in the
Balkans, 4 INV. MGMT. & FIN. INNOVATIONS 31 (2007); Giang Truong et al.,
Cost-of-Capital Estimation and Capital-Budgeting Practice in Australia, 33
AuSTL. J. MGMT. 95 (2008). See also Martin Holm6n & Bengt Pramborg, Capital
Budgeting and Political Risk: Empirical Evidence, 20 J. INT'L FIN. MGT. & ACCT.
105 (2009); Adel Abed Rabbo al Khattab et al., The Use of Political Risk
Assessment Techniques in Jordanian Multinational Corporations, 14 J. RISK
RES. 97 (2011); Satish Verma et al., A Survey of Capital Budgeting Practices in
Corporate India, 13 VISION-J. BUS. PERSP. 1 (2009).
2016]
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the outflows and inflows. A project is desirable if the net present
value of such outflows and inflows is positive. Much turns on the
determination of the appropriate discount rate. It is common to
use the firm's weighted average cost of capital as the discount.
1 8
Another method is the internal rate of return. This method
avoids choosing a discount rate because it is determined
internally by calculating the rate that would cause the cash
outflows and inflows to net to zero. The result of the calculation
is the yield of every dollar put into the project.19 If that rate
clears an internal hurdle set by the company, often linked to the
obligations a company has to holders of its equity and debt, the
contemplated investment is desirable.
20
A third method is the payback method. Under this approach,
the firm calculates the period of time needed for the amount
invested in a project to be paid for by the net cash flows
generated by the project.21 All things equal, projects with shorter
payback periods are more desirable than projects with longer
periods. The payback method is easier to use than the net
present value and internal rate of return methods, but because
it is only concerned with the time it takes to pay for a particular
asset, it does not take into account the potential value of that
asset beyond the payback period.
22
Political risk can be taken into account under each of these
methods by adjusting the expected cash flows downward for such
risk, and then in the case of the net present value method,
18. Quantitative Methods Net Present Value and the Internal Rate of
Return, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-level-1/
quantitative- methods/discounted- cash- flow- npv- irr.asp (last visited Feb. 16,
2016). Despite theoretical and empirical shortcomings, the Capital Pricing
Asset Model (CAPM) is frequently used to calculate the cost of capital. See
Graham & Harvey, Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance, supra note 17, at
201 (discussing broad use of CAPM method); Giang Truong et al., supra note
17, at 107 (discussing the same result in Australia); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth
R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25 (2004) (arguing against using the CAPM on theoretical and empirical
grounds).
19. Robert Schmidt, Understanding the Difference Between NVP vs IRR,
PROPERTYMETRICS (June 28, 2013), http://www.propertymetrics.com/blog/2013
/06/28/npv-vs-irr/.
20. Charles Tooman, Measuring Opportunity and Risk in Global Energy
Investments: Practices and Techniques for Assessing International Investment
Risk and Enhancing Capital Allocation, 10 J. STRUCTURED & PROJECT FIN. 62,
68 (2004).
21. Payback Method/Payback Period Formula, ACCOUNTING TOOLS, http://
www.accountingtools.com/payback-period-formula (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
22. Id.
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discounting the adjusted cash flows. With the net present value
method, a roughly equivalent result would come from leaving
expected cash flows as they are and adjusting the discount rate
upward for the risk instead.2 3 Apparently, this is the approach
preferred by foreign investors, and it is not uncommon for there
to be discount rates of twenty percent or more.2 4 Similarly, in the
internal rate of return method, adjusting for risk could be done
by moving the rate of return downward, thus making it harder
for a project to clear the internal hurdle set by the firm. Finally,
although the payback method oes not rely on a discount or rate
of return, risk could also be accounted for by requiring a shorter
payback period.
Two observations about the use of these methods are
relevant to this Article. First, some commentators observe that
as firms become more sophisticated and computing ability
increases, the net present value and internal rate of return
methods are used more frequently, particularly by larger firms
25
and perhaps by those from developed countries.26 However, the
payback method continues to be widely used.2 7 There is some
23. See Stephan A. Ross, Uses, Abuses, and Alternatives to the Net-Present-
Value-Rule, 24 FIN. MGMT. 96, 98 (1995). In the net present value method, since
the discount rate is often linked to the weighted average cost of capital, political
risk can be taken into account through the calculation of that cost. Charles
Tooman lists ways in which such risk premiums can be calculated, each with
advantages and disadvantages. Tooman, supra note 20, at 67.
24. V. Ravi Anshuman et al., Accounting for Sovereign Risk When Investing
in Emerging Markets, 23 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41 (2011).
25. See, e.g., Graham & Harvey, Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance,
supra note 17, at 197 (finding that larger firms use the net present value method
significantly more than smaller firms).
26. See, e.g., Niels Hermes et al., Capital Budgeting Practices: A
Comparative Study of the Netherlands and China, 16 INT'L Bus. REV. 630
(2007). In their study, the chief financial officers of 250 Dutch companies and
300 Chinese companies were surveyed. 89% of Dutch respondents said they
almost always use the net present value method, while only 49% of Chinese
respondents did so. Id. at 639, 641. The authors attribute this difference in part
to the level of development of the two countries, but do not want to draw too
strong a connection: there does not appear to be much of a difference in how
often Dutch firms and Chinese firms use the internal rate of return method and
the capital asset pricing model to estimate the cost of equity. Id. at 632, 651.
27. Scott Beasley and Eugene Brigham find that after reviewing surveys
over a forty-year period that the traditional payback method has declined in use
while the net present value and internal rate of return methods have increased:
2016]
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indication that the difficulties in assessing political risk are at
play here. As discussed above, firms which use the net present
value method do adjust the discount rate for political risk, but
several observers show the quantification of such risk is
difficult. 28 Thus, in a survey of Swedish multinational firms,
Martin Holm6n and Bengt Pramborg found that firms tend to
use the net present value method when political risk is perceived
to be relatively low, but use the payback method when political
risk increases. A plausible explanation is that the payback
method allows firms to avoid high deliberation costs. Further,
when there is a high threat of a taking, there is a sense in which
the net present value and payback period methods roughly
equate anyway because net present value is likely to be based on
short-term cash flows that would fall within the payback
period.29 Under some circumstances, then, it makes sense for a
firm to base its investment decision, not on the value of the
J natiual
P~-kd fl6d rrit~ N~l 11M1
SCOTT BEASLEY & EUGENE BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE
377 (2008). For a more detailed discussion of the history of capital budgeting
methods, see V6ronique Blum, Capital Budgeting Practices in Companies with
Activity Abroad: The Evolution of Tools Through Time (Grenoble Ecole de
Management, Working Paper No. SPR/WPS 06-02, 2006).
28. See, e.g., Kldra Szics Markovics, A Comprehensive Review of Scientific
Literature on Methods for Determining Discount Rates in Corporate Practices, 8
CLUB ECON. MISKOLC 81 (2012) (discussing the various ways firms calculate
the discount rate); Tooman, supra note 20, at 68 (making a similar point about
the difficulty of making risk adjustments); B.C. Lee & J.G. Powell, Valuation of
Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Political Risk 1 (University of
Wollongong, Faculty of Business, Economics Working Paper No. 99-8, 1999)
(arguing that "appropriate risk adjusted discount rates are notoriously difficult
to estimate in an international setting"). There are several country risk rating
services, including the Economist Intelligence Unit, Euromoney, Institutional
Investor, International Country Risk Guide, Moody's, Political Risk Services,
and Standard & Poors. For a discussion of the ratings, see Suhejla Hoti &
Michael McAleer, An Empirical Assessment of Country Risk Ratings and
Associated Models, 18 J. ECON. SURV. 539 (2004). Carl McGowan and Susan
Moeller propose a method that would allow firms to engage in such analysis on
their own. Carl B. McGowan, Jr. & Susan E. Moeller, A Model for Making
Foreign Direct Investment Decisions Using Real Variables for Political and
Economic Risk Analysis, 7 MANAGING GLOBAL TRANSITIONS 27 (2009).
29. Holm6n & Pramborg, supra note 17, at 109, 127.
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project during its full lifetime, but only on its value during the
project's payback period.
Second, there are some indications that firms that do use
the net present value and internal rate of return methods
sometimes misapply them in their investment decision making
when it comes to risk analysis. In an older study, Edward
Farragher found that although a large majority of U.S.
companies surveyed used sophisticated techniques in their
financial analysis, about half of them did not use quantitative
analysis in assessing risk.30 Therefore, in some companies, risk
analysis takes place apart from financial projections. Most
managers surveyed reported that strategic factors were more
important than financial analysis when deciding whether to
invest in a project.31 It also appears that some companies will
not use the net present value method, out of lack of experience
or training or doubts about the usefulness of the method.32 In
such cases, other planning methods-such as standardized
checklists, consultations with groups of experts, or scenario
analyses-are used alone or in combination with quantitative
methods.
33
30. Edward J. Farragher et al., Current Capital Investment Practices, 44
ENG. ECONOMIST 137, 144 (1999).
31. Id. at 146. These results concur with Nico Sykianakis' case study of a
Greek ice cream firm's decision to invest in the Balkans. The treasurer of that
company writes, "[C]ountry risk did not have any quantitative expression and
was not incorporated in the NPV analysis." Sykianakis, supra note 17, at 35. As
to the NPV's role in the decision of whether or not invest, the treasurer says, "If
relying only on NPV, no investment would have take[n] place in the Balkans.
Greek entrepreneurs make FDI decisions with their instinct .... Any decision
for investing relied on market and strategic criteria." Id. Similarly, in the
survey conducted by Farragher et al., 45% of respondents aid that they would
accept a project if it offered strategic advantages even if it had a negative net
present value. Farragher et al., supra note 30, at 145. See also Alfredo Jimen6z
et al., The Influence of Political Risk on the Scope of Internationalization of
Regulated Companies: Insights from a Spanish Sample, 49 J. WORLD BUS. 301
(2014). The authors find through statistical analysis that companies, in
particular those in highly-regulated industries, will sometimes invest in
countries with high political risk because they believe they have enough
political power to gain a competitive advantage in such countries. Id. at 302.
32. For example, Adel Rabbo al Hattab et al. report that only 9.3% of
Jordanian multinational companies used "scientific" techniques to assess
political risk. The rest used heuristic approaches because they are easier and
cheaper. Further, since the companies lack confidence in the reliability of
domestic economic data, they are equally doubtful about foreign numeric data
used to quantify risk in other countries. Al Khattab et al., supra note 17, at 105,
107.
33. Id. at 99 100.
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Investors also manage the risk of a taking through the
project's structure. Among other things, a firm might invest
incrementally, for example, by opening shops in only a few
locations before expanding. When practical, an investor might
use obsolete or second-hand equipment to reduce capital costs
and losses in the event of a taking.34 It can keep intellectual,
financial, and other assets outside of the country and license or
lease them to the subsidiary in the host state.35 Over time,
leverage shifts from the investor to the host state and with it,
the risk of a taking. In a large infrastructure project, an investor
might lower this risk by setting in advance a time when the
project will be transferred to the host state.36 A firm will also try
to structure the project so that the revenue will start to stream
as soon as possible.37 In addition, a firm can take out political
risk via insurance. Such coverage is useful in its own right, but
also enlists third-party support for the project. Since political
risk insurance is offered by international financial institutions,
a host state might refrain from taking the investment because it
does not want to harm its relationship with those
organizations.38 In that regard, financing for the project can be
structured so that international, governmental, or quasi-
governmental agencies participate in the project.
39
Notably, if political risk is factored into financial projections
or into the structure of the investment, political risk is then
shifted from the investor to the host state. Part IV will discuss
arguments that are perfectly appropriate for this matter.
However, costs are associated with this shift of risk. For those
companies that do engage in financial analysis, a risky
investment project will be worthwhile only if there is an increase
in cash flows. If it is dealing with a country in need of
investment, the investor might be in a position to obtain those
34. Sykianakis, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing how an ice cream company
took an incremental approach and used secondhand equipment in its foreign
investment).
35. RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 2, at 39.
36. Anshuman et al., supra note 24, at 46. Project finance is designed to
limit the risk of loss to the assets of the project. Id. at 47. In this regard, see
Kojo Yelpaala, Rethinking the Foreign Direct Investment Process and Incentives
in Post-Conflict Transition Countries, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 23 (2010)
(discussing ways in which build- operate -transfer projects can be structured to
shift political risk to host governments).
37. Holm6n & Pramborg, supra note 17, at 120.
38. Anshuman et al., supra note 24, at 47.
39. RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 2, at 39.
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increases; otherwise, it will not invest at all. This represents a
cost to the host country or its consumers. The same applies to
risk mitigation practices: the hosting state bears the cost of such
measures in the form of inferior equipment, less technology
transfers, and a faster payout period. As discussed below, this
raises the question of whether such 'costs' are relevant to the
compensation a host state should pay if there is a taking or
breach of an international investment standard.
2. The Host State
Host states engage with foreign investors by setting general
investment policies,40 screening proposed investments, and
participating directly in specific projects. However, there appear
to be few, if any, surveys of methods states use when engaging
in pre-investment financial and risk analyses. Sornarajah notes
that screening agencies sometimes require potential investors to
submit feasibility studies as part of the investment approval
process,41  and such studies will likely include financial
projections. Further, Timothy Irwin recommends relatively
sophisticated valuation and risk assessment methods that states
should use when asked to issue government guarantees for
foreign investment.4 2  This Article will assume that
administrative agencies that screen potential investments or
evaluate proposals for direct state involvement in investments
use a variety of quantitative and non-quantitative methods akin
to those used by investors.
4 3
Host states also use risk mitigation strategies. At the
40. UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTMENT POLICY
MONITOR (2013), http://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Investment-Policy-
Monitor.aspx. For country- specific discussions of investment policies, see
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEW
SERIES (2013), http://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Investment-Policy-
Review-%28Series%29.aspx.
41. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 104.
42. IRWIN, supra note 16, at 128 40. See also INT'L INSTITUTE FOR ENV'T
AND DEV., HOW TO SCRUTINIZE A PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT: A GUIDE
FOR THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR BASED ON EXPERIENCE FROM THE CASPIAN
REGION 26 30 (2012), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/1603111ED.pdf (explaining how
corporate finance concepts can be applied to production sharing agreements).
43. For a discussion of the quantitative and qualitative criteria and other
guidelines used by Australia, Great Britain, and South Africa in risk
assessment and allocation, see id. at 108 09. The state also determines the
effect of investment in general or of a particular investment on other state
interests, such as national security.
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statutory and administrative levels, performance, local content,
and local participation requirements can be understood in part
as reducing the risk that the positive spillover effects of foreign
investment will not be realized. Further, specific transactions
can be structured with a view towards minimizing perceived
risks from the host state's perspective. The types of
requirements that appear in investment statutes are often part
of the contracts that memorialize transactions in which the state
participates. The type of agreement itself can change to adjust
for risk. For example, in the energy sector, the shift from long-
term concession agreements to production sharing agreements,
and more recently, to service agreements has been explained as
an attempt by host states to retain ownership over their natural
resources and to reallocate risks between the host state and
foreign investor.
44
From the host state's perspective, the use of risk mitigation
strategies is rational and appropriate. But just as the pre-
investment strategies used by foreign investors can be said to
impose costs on the state, so too can those taken by host states
be said to impose costs on the prospective investor. An investor's
current business model might be incompatible with one or more
of the host state's requirements. This leads to greater cash
outflows (and thus less inflows) or higher risk-or both-
because second-best alternatives to at least some aspects of the
model must be used that create uncertainty. If an investor
adjusts for these requirements it might forego the investment
entirely or require a higher return, either of which represents an
off-setting cost to the host state. However, if the literature on a
company's behavior is accurate, some companies might not
adjust for such home state strategies. The decision to invest will
be made under some other set of guidelines that does not try to
quantify and adjust for risk.
The picture that emerges from this brief review of the pre-
investment behavior of foreign investors and host states is what
one would expect of actors with limited knowledge. Those with
sufficient resources will try to approximate a world of perfect
44. KIRSTEN BINDEMANN, PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 11 (1999) (discussing the history of petroleum contracts
and comparing the allocation of risks and benefits between concession
agreements, production sharing agreements, and service contracts (as well as
joint ventures)); Abbas Ghandi & C-Y Cynthia Lin, Oil and Gas Service
Contracts Around the World: A Review, 3 ENERGY STRAT. REV. 63 (2014)
(arguing that host state interest in service contracts is informed, in part, by
sovereignty concerns).
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information through various quantitative and qualitative
techniques, while others with less resources or who are skeptical
of quantitative methods will use other heuristic devices as they
decide to invest or to allow an investment. All, however, appear
in some degree to use multi-factor decision-making processes.
Moreover, investors and host states use risk management ools
in hopes of reducing the risk of disappointing results. The
question for this Article is the degree, if any, to which the pre-
investment behavior of the investor or host state and the
possible motivations behind their respective behaviors should
affect what standard of compensation is used when there is
disappointment, and once chosen, how that standard should be
applied.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
The remainder of this Article responds to the question
raised from the prior Section by examining a few issues in
compensation law. This Part begins by exploring the allocation
of risks and costs between investors and host states, as well as
the role compensation plays in that allocation. It then discusses
standards of compensation as they are embodied in contracts
and treaties, compensation for legal and illegal takings and
breaches of other investment standards, and compensation
standards as they are used in dispute resolution.
A. COMPENSATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF RISK
As mentioned above, this Article suggests that when a
prospective investor factors political risk into its quantitative
and qualitative financial projections or takes precautionary
measures such as off-shoring intellectual property, this can
represent a cost to the state in the form of less investment and
less income or higher prices to consumers in the host state, or
maybe no investment at all. Similarly, when a host state takes
measures to ensure that an investment will benefit the host
state and its citizens, such measures impose costs on the
investor that could rebound on the host state as the investor
responds to those measures, thus creating a loop of increasing
costs to the host state.
Perhaps, it is entirely appropriate that this would happen.
If a risk should be allocated to the party better able to manage
it, particularly by avoiding or reducing such risk, then by
2016]
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definition, the state will be the better risk-bearing, and thus
cost-bearing, party when it comes to political risk. Likewise, if a
host state imposes requirements on investment to further
particular economic and political ends, it seems appropriate that
it "pays" for them. Indeed, there are arguments to the contrary.
Sometimes the investor is financially better able to absorb
losses, and with respect to measures designed to further the
aims of the host country, it can be argued the investor should
pay for the privilege of doing business in a host state by
contributing to the goals set by that state.
45
It is unlikely that these competing views of risk allocation
will be resolved, but for purposes of this Article, a number of
observations can be made about that allocation. One is that even
though the risk associated with a project has been distributed, if
there is a taking or breach of an investment standard, the level
of compensation chosen could result in undercompensation or
overcompensation if that allocation is not taken into account.
46
Full compensation is often equated with the fair market value of
the business, including expected profits if they can be
established. As Irwin points out, theoretically, if a state takes an
investment and pays the investor fair market value, the state
neither gains nor loses because although it has gained an asset
it has also paid for it. 47 The same applies for the investor.
Sornarajah, who argues against full compensation as customary
international law, describes the logic of the Hull formula: "If the
45. For a discussion of risk allocation in infrastructure projects, see DALE
COOPER ET AL., PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES: MANAGING RISK IN
LARGE PROJECTS AND COMPLEX PROCUREMENTS 161 70 (2005) (stating ways
in which risk can be allocated via contract); IRWIN, supra note 16, at 5, 65 67.
These and other studies discuss risk identification and allocation in qualitative
terms. See also Awad S. Hanna et al., Construction Risk Identification and
Allocation: Cooperative Approach, 139 J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGT.
1098 (2013). Some of the literature proposes quantitative methods for allocating
risk. See, e.g., Garshasb Khazaeni et al, Optimum Risk Allocation Model for
Construction Contracts: Fuzzy TOPSIS Approach, 39 CAN. J. CIV. ENGINEERING
789 (2012). Others explore desirable risk allocation strategies for particular
kinds of projects or in certain countries. See, e.g., Djoen San Santoso et al.,
Public-Private Partnerships for Tollway Construction and Operation: Risk
Assessment and Allocation from the Perspective of Investors, 17 J.
CONSTRUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45 (2012); Chan et al., Empirical
Study of Risk Assessment and Allocation of Public-Private Partnership Projects
in China, 27 J. MGMT. ENGINEERING 136 (2011).
46. As Alan Schwartz points out, the chance of mispricing arises whenever
a third-party is called on to determine the value of performance. Alan Schwartz,
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275 77 (1980). He argues
that in contracts, damages are often undercompensatory. Id. at 276.
47. IRWIN, supra note 16, at 172.
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full value of the property which is subject to the expropriation
and the anticipated earnings of the foreign investment are
immediately replaced in currency which is convertible, the
foreign investor will not have suffered in any material
sense . ,,48 This suggests, again theoretically, that the state
and the foreign investor would be indifferent to whether there is
a taking or not: in at least monetary terms, their positions are
not affected. However, for either party, this "equitable" result
assumes that the level of compensation accurately reflects any
risk premiums that the investor has charged as well as the value
of any pre-investment measures taken. Otherwise, one party or
the other will be put in a better position than it would have been
had there been no taking.
Suppose a company that is about to engage in a foreign
investment has a choice between using one of two types of
equipment, one that is obsolete in the firm's home country and
another that is state-of-the-art. The firm worries that its
equipment will be taken without compensation, so it chooses to
use the obsolete equipment, which the firm is willing to lose even
if it is not compensated for it. As Anshuman points out, a
scenario such as this can lead to an unexpected result.49 The
investor chooses the obsolete equipment as a risk management
device, in case it is taken by the host state. The investor would
seem to enjoy a windfall if the host state does not take the
equipment because the investor would get to keep something it
was prepared to lose in the first place.
This reasoning can proceed a step further: if the state takes
the equipment but is then required to pay its fair market value
as compensation, the windfall is restored to the investor. From
the state's perspective, this result would seem egregious because
the state has already borne the political risk associated with the
investor's risk mitigation strategy. Although the investor never
sees these "risk payments," the state has incurred the cost of lost
productivity or technical knowledge that would have been
realized had the more modern equipment been installed.
Further, it would be worse if the investor's risk management
strategy had required a higher share of the cash flows from the
investment50 Thus, as far as compensation is concerned,
48. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 414.
49. Anshuman et al., supra note 24, at 45.
50. I use this illustration only to give a sense of the issue. Realistically, the
equipment would depreciate over time. Anshuman uses a better quantitative
example. Id. A hypothetical oil company estimates that an oil project will earn
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sometimes the issue is not with the value of the taken asset, but
rather with the allocation of risk and whether it has already
been paid for by the party to whom it was assigned. If the
company felt there was no risk of a taking without compensation
and used state-of-the-art equipment instead, it would be the host
state that would gain a windfall at the expense of the company
if the host state takes the equipment without compensating the
investor at fair market value.
51
This seems to be a surprising, perhaps absurd, result. Taken
to its logical extreme, it appears tantamount to arguing that if a
promisee takes into account the possibility that the promisor will
breach, the promisor is relieved from paying damages if such a
breach occurs. Or, if a lender charges a higher interest rate
because it fears a borrower will default, the borrower is relieved
of his duty to pay. Concerns about undercompensation or
overcompensation do not necessarily lead to complete relief from
the obligation to compensate, however. Take, for instance, the
requirement to mitigate damages. The rule requires the rational
promisee to act as if the contract law provides no remedies at all.
Such a promisee would take reasonable steps to minimize its
losses. Damages are not available to a promisee who fails to do
so; they only make up for the shortfall. Similarly, in most cases,
if a lender has charged an interest rate that includes a risk
premium over and above what a lender would normally charge,
it seems appropriate that the borrower pay both principal and
interest. However, if the lender has engaged in rent-seeking,
then issues of overcompensation arise.
It can also be argued that other reasons for compensation
override concerns about overcompensation even in the
hypotheticals described above. Lessons can be drawn from
domestic takings jurisprudence. In the United States, various
reasons have been given for the Takings Clause and the
requirement to pay just compensation, not dissimilar to those
pre-tax income of $350 million per year. The company believes there is a high
probability of expropriation, so it uses a 20% discount rate to calculate the
present value of the cash flows, 8% of which represents a required internal rate
of return and a 12% sovereign risk premium, which in turn reflects an annual
probability of expropriation equal to 10%. The company will then try to
negotiate an arrangement whereby the annual cash flows to the company result
in an internal rate of return of at least 20%. If the host state finds out that the
company has secured an income stream based on a 10% probability of a taking
in any given year, the host will realize unless it does take the investment, the
investor will receive a major windfall.
51. As discussed in Part IV, the same issue arises with anticipated profits.
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used to justify compensation at the international level discussed
earlier. The Clause has been understood as promoting fairness,
deterring the abuse of small groups, preventing "fiscal illusion"
by making salient the costs of a taking, diffusing the power of
interest groups, reducing landholder opposition to regulation,
preventing government rent-seeking, and preventing politicians
from taking property for selfish reasons instead of public ends.
52
As a historical matter, the compensation requirement in
international law has its origins in a state's interest in
protecting its nationals abroad, an interest that extended to
nationals' property.53 However, it is not unusual for a norm, once
in place, to have multiple uses and consequences, so that the
compensation norm on the international level might have
numerous effects analogous to those on the domestic level. For
example, if the norm does prevent host state leaders from taking
property for personal instead of public reasons, it encourages
legal takings (takings done for a public purpose without
discrimination and with compensation) by reinforcing the public
purpose requirement.
Another response is that full compensation actually
undercompensates the investor. This is one of the criticisms
leveled against the contract law equivalent of full
compensation-expectation damages. Disputably, the damage
limitations of certainty and foreseeability and the mitigation
requirement (and in countries like the United States, where
attorney's fees are generally not available to the prevailing
party) make it unlikely that damages will put the injured party
in the position it would have been had there been performance.
54
In other words, expectation damages cannot compensate for the
intrinsic value a promisee has placed on the promisor's
performance.55 A case can be made that an investor might
similarly be undercompensated even when the full compensation
standard is used. Recovery by investors has been limited
through doctrines like certainty, and there may well be intrinsic
values that are not captured by full compensation.
56
52. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of
Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1677 90 (2010) (providing an
overview of the some of the major justifications for the Takings Clause).
53. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 11, 36.
54. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1229 (1994); Schwartz, supra note 46.
55. Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to
Contract Law Remedies, 56 UCLAL. REV. 59, 107 (2008).
56. On the other hand, it is hard to see how intrinsic value fits into the
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Nonetheless, any of the justifications given for the
compensation requirement can be qualified to some extent,
particularly when brought into a multi-factor analysis that is
often used in actual disputes. It might be unfair for a host state
to take property without paying for it, but it might also be unfair
for an investor to receive a windfall, especially if the state has
already borne the cost of a possible taking with no indication of
rent-seeking. Similarly, the compensation requirement could
indeed make the state aware of the true costs of its actions, but
that still might not override a state's need and right to regulate
its economy or environment, let alone to engage in sweeping
economic or political reform. Finally, any compensation
standard can risk being too stingy or too generous.57 The concern
about overcompensation continues to be a factor worth
considering even if it is not the deciding one.
B. COMPENSATION STANDARDS IN CONTRACTS, TREATIES, AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Host states and investors in direct transactions can agree
on a standard of compensation in their contracts. Host states
often decide on specific standards in treaties with other states.
Alternatively, a standard can emerge into customary
international law. This Section discusses how the risk
assessment and amelioration conducted by a company and host
country may affect the choice of compensation standard and how
the chosen standard reflects these considerations.
more sophisticated financial and risk analyses used by a significant number of
companies.
57. This is why some contracts scholars prefer specific performance as a
remedy because it allows the parties' own valuation of performance to control.
See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 55, at 108; Schwartz, supra note 46. These
concerns correspond to the Articles on State Responsibility's preference for
restitution as a form of reparations. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note
4, art. 36(1). However, in the investment cases discussed in Part IV(D), most
investors sought compensation. This could indicate that irrespective of any
intrinsic value investors might attach to an investment, it is still in the
investor's interest to seek damages, often because restitution is impractical or
domestic and market conditions that led to the taking make it undesirable to
remain in the host country. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market
Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1610, 1613 (2008) (pointing out that when a buyer can find replacement




With respect to investment contracts, investors and host
states can be more nuanced in their choice of standard. In their
due diligence, host states should inquire directly how
prospective investors are identifying political risk and adjusting
to it since host states, in one way or another, will bear the costs
of that risk. If the parties choose full compensation measured by
fair market value, they should plan in advance to avoid
undercompensation or overcompensation. Host states with
strong bargaining power may be able to insist on appropriate
compensation, thus permitting the use of less-than-fair-market
value under certain circumstances. However, investors with
resources are rarely willing to shoulder political risk without the
guarantee of full compensation, and even when they do, they are
likely to require something of value in exchange, which increases
costs to the states.
58
2. Treaties
Additional issues arise in how standards of compensation
are embodied in treaties. Since treaties are between states
rather than between host states and investors, states might
avail themselves of the flexibility of the appropriate
compensation standard, allowing full compensation while
providing an option to pay less in some circumstances. This
standard may have greater adoption in future treaties,
particularly as developing countries become more assertive and
developed countries gain more experience as host states in
complying with international investment standards.
59
58. These points illustrate Katz's argument that while it is hard to embody
efficient norms in treaties, parties probably have enough information to craft
norms that suit their particular needs in individual transactions. See Avery
Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 507 (2004) [hereinafter Katz, Economics]; Avery W.
Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract Under the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 378, 381 82 (2005) [hereinafter Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract].
See also Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Purdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99,
158 (2000) (arguing that parties might decide in advance on a contract remedy
above or below the standard measure of expectation damages).
59. UNCTAD estimates that 1,300 out of the 3,000 bilateral investment
treaties in effect have reached the stage in which they can be terminated at any
time. By 2018, that number is expected to grow to about 1,600. U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], World Investment
Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development,
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Nevertheless, present investment treaties often provide for full
compensation or fair market value as the standard for takings.
60
A state committing to pay full compensation in the event of a
taking is not unlike guaranteeing an investment up to its fair
market value. But why would a state agree to this higher
standard in advance?
Avery Katz maintains it is unlikely that norms codified in
statutes and treaties are or can be chosen for efficiency reasons
alone because states do not have enough information to know
whether such norms will encourage efficient outcomes in all
cases.61 Katz explains that a rule impacts many aspects of
contracting behavior, such as the decision to perform or breach,
how much to mitigate in the event of breach, and how much
information to disclose during contract negotiations. It is thus
impossible for a state to know in advance how the rule will affect
the parties in every transaction.62 In his view, the rules
embodied in "public legal texts" are better understood as the
results from the tug-of-wars and compromises that mark
political and diplomatic processes.63 Applying Katz's theory
more broadly, states might choose the full compensation
standard because they want to secure reciprocal protection for
their investors, or because such norms serve as pre-commitment
strategies that provide for the benefits of takings clauses and
other benefits,64 or because the standard signals greater
openness to foreign investment and thereby attracts investors.
Along these lines, when bilateral investment treaties began to
UNCTAD/WIR/2013, 108 10 (2013).
60. E.g., Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment
Treaty Law, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 357 (2007); Valerie H.
Ruttenberg, The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty Program: Variations
on the Model, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 121 (1987); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The
Bilateral Treaty Investment Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 201 (1988).
61. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract, supra note 58 at 382.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. E.g., Raquel Ferndndez & Jonathan Portes, Returns to Regionalism: An
Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements, 12 WORLD
BANK ECON. REV. 197 (1998). The authors explain that states should be
encouraged to enter regional trade agreements for a number of non-traditional
reasons, including support for domestic policy reforms and discouraging change
to that law by subsequent regimes. See id. at 206 07. Membership might also
strengthen the state's bargaining power at the international level. See id. at
211 12. Entry can also help insure against protectionist moves by
counterparties and help coordinate trade and non-trade policies, such as
environmental standards. See id. at 208 13.
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mushroom in number, Andrew Guzman opined that although
developing countries as a group are likely to benefit from
extracting concessions from investors in the form of opposition
to the full compensation standard, each state has an incentive to
adopt the full or even better-than-full standard to stand out from
the others.
6 5
Regardless, it is worth considering whether the full
compensation standard does in fact affect a company's decision
to invest in a particular country. On one hand, practitioners and
scholars urge potential investors to assess the legal environment
of a potential host state, including the investment reaties that
a state has entered, as part of pre-investment due diligence, and
to also consider structuring investments in order to take
advantage of favorable investment treaties.6 6 As discussed in
Part III, multiple companies take into account the political
stability of a host country as they make investment decisions
and demand higher returns to account for political risk.
6 7
Rodolphe Desbordes suggests that host countries can express
and pay for this risk through tax relief, and host states with less
resources could choose incentives such as favorable laws as
proxies for direct payments.6 8 Thus, a host state might see the
full compensation standard as part of a larger package of non-
monetary incentives.
On the other hand, it is not always clear how important the
treaty guarantee is in theory or in practice. The promise to
compensate at fair market value is roughly equivalent to a
promise not to expropriate at all. Accordingly, an investor would
be expected to assess the risk that a state will not pay full
65. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
639, 643 (1998). But see SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN
THE BIT GENERATION 83 123 (2009) (arguing that the rapid acceptance of
bilateral investment treaties and their standardization is better understood
through network effects: a state otherwise inclined not to agree to a standard
term does so because it wants to enjoy the benefits that accrue when significant
numbers of states adopt a common standard).
66. See, e.g., RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 2, at 25 26, 38.
67. See text accompanying notes 23 28 supra. See also Rodolphe
Desbordes, Global and Diplomatic Political Risks and Foreign Direct
Investment, 22 ECON. & POL. 92 (2010) (arguing that U.S. multinational
enterprises consider global and diplomatic risks when deciding to invest). See
also Kwan V. Le, Political and Economic Determinants of Private Investment,
16 J. INT'L DEV. 589 (2004) (finding, among other things, that unconstitutional
regime change tends to hinder private investment).
68. Desbordes, supra note 67, at 120.
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compensation just as it would assess the risk of expropriation.
But because of this rough equivalency,6 9 the investor has only
delayed the risk analysis one step further. This might explain
why the risk assessment literature focuses much more on
conditions that might lead to the taking itself as if compensation
is unavailable. As Irwin puts it, "[The company's] decision
whether to invest.., depends on its estimate of the probability
of the investment being expropriated and the values of the
investment when the government keeps the promise and when
the government expropriates."70 If an investor discounts the risk
of expropriation without adjusting for the possibility of
compensation, the problem of possible overcompensation
discussed in the last Section reemerges-albeit in a somewhat
different form.
Since a commitment to a standard of compensation can be
part of a larger package of incentives a state might offer to a
potential investor, it follows that commitment might be
important when compared to other incentives or factors that
make a country attractive, or it might not. This is one of the
reasons South Africa recently decided to terminate some of its
bilateral investment treaties, after having entered into a
number of them during its return to democracy in the 1990s. The
government noted that in the years following, it had received
foreign investment from companies whose home countries had
not entered into bilateral investment treaties with South Africa
and no investment from companies from countries who had.
71
This experience is anecdotal. According to an UNCTAD
literature review, more recent studies indicate that bilateral
investment treaties can lead to increased investment, largely by
contributing to greater political certainty and investment
69. One can calculate a legal remedy such as compensation or damages as
Dq, where D is the remedy and q is the probability of enforcement of the remedy.
Qi Zhou, An Economic Perspective on Legal Remedies for Unconscionable
Contracts, 6 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 25, 32 (2010). If full compensation is
equated with fair market value (FMV), the remedy becomes FMVq. Since the
host state completely controls whether or not it will pay FMV absent third-party
intervention, q is equivalent to the probability the investor would have received
full FMV without a taking. So, third-party adjudication can be seen as a way of
increasing q. Id.
70. Irwin, supra note 16, at 90.
71. Xavier Carim, Dep't. Trade & Indus., Rep. S. Afr., Update on the Review
of Bilateral Investment Treaties in South Africa (Feb. 15, 2013), http://
www.safpi.org/sites/default/files/publications/dti-review of bits ppc 2013021
5.pdf.
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protection.7 2 At the same time, regional and preferential trade
agreements tend to have a greater impact than bilateral
investment treaties because they improve economic conditions
such as market size and costs of resources-which appear to be
more important to businesses in investment decisions than the
protections provided in bilateral investment treaties.
73
Similarly, it is not clear how treaty commitments, let alone
a commitment to pay a specific standard of compensation, are
accounted for in quantitative assessments of political risk. For
example, the International Country Risk Guide, a proprietary
publication used in quantifying country risk, divides such risk
into economic, financial, and political components.7 4 In assessing
political risk, numeric scores are given in relation to twelve
parameters: government stability, socio-economic conditions,
investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict,
corruption, political involvement of the military, religious
tensions, law and order, ethnic tension, democratic
accountability, and bureaucratic quality.75 A state's treaty
commitments, including the commitment to pay full
compensation, could be relevant to the scoring of some of these
parameters, such as government stability and law and order, but
it is unclear how much weight would be given to them in
comparison to all other factors.
A state may therefore choose to commit to full compensation
72. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], The
Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, 55 (2009)
[hereinafter Role of International Investment Agreements]. The study points out,
however, that it is difficult to draw policy lessons from econometric studies
because of limitations in the methodology and lack of data. See id. at 56 58.
Since UNCTAD's somewhat positive report in 2009, studies have been equivocal
about the impact of investment treaties on foreign direct investment flows. See,
e.g., Axel Berger et al., More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects on FDI?
Not a Bit!, 112 ECON. LETTERS 270 (2011) (finding that there is no correlation
between BITs that contain strong investor dispute provisions and increased
FDI); Selen Sarisoy Geurin, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Encourage FDI
Outflows? (Ctr. Eur. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 333 (Feb. 2011)), http://
homepages.ulb.ac.be/-mzanardi/BTW/Guerin.pdf (finding a strong correlation
between BITs entered by EU member stands and investment outflows to
developing countries).
73. UNCTAD, Role of International Investment Agreements, supra note 72,
at 110.
74. See Hoti & McAleer, supra note 28, at 557 58; International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), PRS GROUP, http://epub.prsgroup.com/products/
international- country- risk- guide -icrg (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
75. Hoti & McAleer, supra note 28, at 557 58.
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in the treaties in hopes of attracting foreign investment, and
there is some evidence that it will do so on balance. However, it
appears that whether a state attracts investment will depend on
a number of factors, such as market conditions, which could be
far more important to the investors. Since it seems likely that a
careful investor will plan as if compensation is unavailable, a
state should weigh whether making such a commitment is
worthwhile. Yet, a state faces a dilemma: if it chooses an
appropriate compensation standard to preserve flexibility, it
risks at least some investors taking the potentially lower
standard into account as they decide whether to invest in the
first place and charge the host state accordingly if they do.
Finally, it should be noted that committing to the full
compensation standard in treaties increases the possibility of
overcompensation. As will be discussed later, although
adjudicators are sensitive to the problem of double payment and
adjust awards accordingly, it is not common that the parties take
the pre-investment allocations of risk into account, except
perhaps in a general way. It is possible that even if an
adjudicator is made aware of this issue, she could decide that
since the host state has agreed to full compensation in the treaty,
the standard should control without adjustment, particularly
because there are other reasons that a state might commit to
such a standard.
3. Customary International Law
As Parts I and II discussed, whether there is a single
standard of compensation under customary international law is
subject to debate. One could conceive of a general and consistent
practice that emerges from the myriad individual transactions
between investors and states-a practice recognized as
obligatory over time. Such a standard could make its way into
treaties (or vice versa), thereby formalizing an existing dynamic
where treaties and customary norms interact with one another.
At the contract level, an individual investor and host state are
able to choose a standard that best fits their respective needs.
The previous Section noted that states might choose the full
compensation standard in their investment treaties for a
number of valid reasons but questioned whether it always makes
sense to do so, particularly when the appropriate compensation
standard provides more flexibility without precluding full
compensation. This Section will draw from some of the law and
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economics literature on contracts to ask whether full
compensation might nevertheless be the preferred standard,
specifically as a customary norm.
76
From an economic perspective, a standard of compensation
(as with any contract rule) should perform three functions: it
should encourage parties to enter into contracts when it is
mutually beneficial to do so, it should encourage the parties to
invest the right amount into the contract to maximize the
benefits gained from the contractual relationship, and it should
give an incentive for each of the parties to perform if the value
to be gained from performance is higher than the cost.
77
Hopefully, a compensation standard in international investment
law would perform the same functions-one around which host
states and investors might coalesce. Such a hope is somewhat
dim.
In a 2003 review of thirty years of law and economics
literature, Eric Posner argues that although the approach has
added a number of insights into the contract law, it has largely
failed in at least two respects.7 8 First, Posner asserts that as a
theory, law and economics has not been able to adequately
explain or predict the content of contract law.79 Posner uses
76. Arguably, these issues might be better understood from a property
paradigm, particularly since much of the takings literature is based on property
principles as previously discussed. In my view, however, the contract analogy is
apt: many foreign investments expressly take the form of contracts, and the
decisions whether to invest, how much to invest, and on the part of the state,
whether to take an investment or not can be seen as similar to those made by
parties in contracts. In support of this position, see JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE
THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, CONTRACTUAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 29 (2013) (explaining that
investment is a form of negotiation between the host state and the investor).
This discussion could have perhaps fit just as easily into the discussion of
treaties. I choose to locate it here because it is intriguing to think of
international norms as emerging out of sub -international or transnational
interactions that crystallize into higher-level norms, or perhaps out of
evolutionary processes that are the concern of evolutionary game theory and
complexity theory.
77. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 57, at 1611.
78. E.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 828 (2003).
79. Id. at 830. For direct rejoinders to Posner's critique, see Ian Ayres,
Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003); Richard
Craswell, In That Case, What is the Question? Economics and the Demands of
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003). Jeffrey Harrison surveys the
influence of law and economics in contract law through a study of citations of
law and economics scholarship in Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Influence ofLaw and
Economics Scholarship on Contract Law: Impressions Twenty-Five Years Later,
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contract remedies as one of several illustrations to support his
argument.80 Perhaps the xpectation measure of damages gives
a promisor proper incentives to perform when it is efficient to do
so and to breach when it is not. This is because the expectation
measure is supposed to represent he value of the contract, so a
promisor will perform when the cost of performance is lower
than that value and will breach when the costs are higher. This
measure also has the salutary effect of allowing the promisor to
breach the contract if another party values performance even
more, as long as the promisor compensates the non-breaching
party.81 But the measure fails to ensure that the promisee does
not over-rely on the contract. Absent a damage award, a
promisee will base its reliance in part on its estimate of the
chances the promisor will default. Expectation damages can
have the unwanted effect of causing the promisee to invest in a
transaction more than is efficient since the promisee knows in
advance that her return is certain.8 2 A better measure of
damages would compensate the promisee when her reliance is
efficient but not otherwise. Yet, Posner points out, expectation
damages continue to be the predominant form of damages
awarded, without much attention paid to the problem of
inefficient reliance.
8 3
A second shortcoming for Posner is that the theory does not
"provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract
68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (2012).
80. See Posner, supra note 78.
81. This is the efficient breach theory. But see Daniel J. Friedman, The
Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Florian Radl, Contractual
Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57, 58 (2013). These critiques argue that the efficient breach theory
proves too much because it would justify conversion. In my view, that particular
critique assumes that there is a one-to-one match between the motivations for
contract law and those that inform property law.
82. As George Cohen puts it, "Other things equal, a higher damage
measure will lead the promisor to take more precautions and mitigation steps,
but will lead the promisee to take fewer precautions and mitigation steps."
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1235 (1994).
83. See Posner, supra note 78, at 835, 838. There are other problems with
the theory. Coase's insight indicates that if negotiation costs are low enough,
any damage rule will lead to efficient outcomes. If a promisee wants
performance badly enough and the measure is low, he will pay the promisor for
performance; if the promisor no longer thinks it is worthwhile to perform and
the measure is high, he will pay the promisee to be released. Id. at 835. The
measure also does not account for the ability to set damages in advance of the
contract and does not work well when there is asymmetric information. Id. at
835 36.
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law."8 4 This follows from the inability to explain existing
doctrine. One of the upshots of the critique of the expectancy
measure is that different measures of damages will be efficient
depending on the circumstances. So, in theory, contract law
could try to embody these different damage measures and
circumstances in the doctrine, but has not done so. One might
pick a measure because it represents the average behavior of
parties, but as Posner points out, that assumption is difficult to
verify in fact.
8 5
Posner notes further that the literature on incomplete
contracts leads to a similar impasse in regulating efficient
performance and reliance.8 6 The focus on this literature is on
contract design as opposed to contract rules. Again, if it were
possible, a contract would be designed to encourage the promisor
to perform if the value of the contract is greater than the cost,
and the promisee to make an optimal investment.8 7 According to
the literature, transaction costs make it impossible for a court to
assess the investment made by the promisee.8 8 Contract law
could solve this problem by providing procedures for parties to
bargain with one another based on their estimates of value and
reliance, but in general, contract law does not supply doctrines
that allow for this kind of ex post bargaining.89 In short, "Simple
models do not justify legal reform because these models exclude
relevant variables. Complex models do not justify legal reform
because the optimal rule depends on empirical conditions that
cannot be observed."90
If Posner is right about the state of law and economics with
regard to contract, what implications might this critique have
for the formation of a standard of compensation under
customary international law? Customary international law is
concerned with a general and consistent practice of states
performed out of a sense of legal obligation. These emerging
practices are not necessarily associated with efficiency, nor does
one normally argue for a particular, efficient norm around which
states should coalesce. In theory, however, if different
compensation rules are efficient under different circumstances,
84. Id. at 830.
85. See id. at 880.
86. See id. at 856.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 857.
89. Id. at 859.
90. Id. at 854.
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then states will not orient their practices around one norm,
whether a substantive norm like full compensation or a process
norm such as a right to renegotiate, since neither can claim to
represent the average practice of individual parties in specific
transactions. Even if such a norm existed, it would be too
complex to be workable. If states did in fact converge on one or
perhaps two compensation standards, the implication would be
that states have other, non-economic reasons for choosing such
standards, just as they would in choosing a particular standard
for a treaty.
At the same time, no matter what the motivation is for
choosing to follow a particular practice, such a method will not
make the problem of inefficient performance or reliance go away.
This is another way in which a state potentially bears the cost of
investment: it has decided to incur monetary costs (or forgo an
investment completely) in furtherance of other goals.
It can be argued that this critique proves too much. Setting
a compensation rule as a customary norm or a treaty norm for
future application is, after all, another way of planning for that
future. The fact that there is no way to predict how a
compensation rule will affect the behavior of the parties is true
of any measure states or investors take before a decision to
invest. Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III, parties do plan for
that future by using methods of varying sophistication to predict
risk and by structuring their agreements in hopes of allocating
that risk. Obviously, as Katz argues, the better tailored the
planning method is to particular circumstances, the more likely
it is to succeed, so a standard of compensation chosen at the
individual transaction level is more likely to result in optimal
levels of investment and performance than one chosen to apply
in all cases.91 Further, it may be that other methods are better
than a compensation standard at obtaining those results, but all
of this is a matter of degree.
Even though a fixed standard may not give adequate
incentives for efficient performance or reliance, and even though
the doctrine itself does not facilitate bargaining between the
parties at the time of performance to adjust for that reliance,
nothing prevents the parties from contracting around the
existing laws. More complex contracts do contain provisions that
encourage efficient reliance on the part of the promisee92 and
91. See Katz, Economics, supra note 58, at 507; Katz, Remedies for Breach
of Contract, supra note 58, at 394.
92. For example, production sharing agreements contain provisions that
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clauses that permit re-pricing to at least some extent.93
Moreover, there is always the possibility of negotiations
throughout the term of a contractual relationship.94 At the other
end of the relationship, it is also expected that performance and
reliance issues will arise when there is a dispute and the
compensation standard is applied, whichever it may be. As will
be discussed in Section D, decision makers appear to be aware of
these issues and some respond to them to greater or lesser
extents. Since none of these measures work universally, it is
difficult to see how any compensation orm rising to the level of
customary international law would do any better.
C. TYPES OF TAKINGS AND BREACHES OF OTHER OBLIGATIONS
Another issue is whether a standard of compensation should
depend on the legality of the taking95 and what rule should apply
when a host state has violated other investment obligations.
Sornarajah takes the view that Chorzow's full reparation
standard should apply only when a state has breached an
obligation of international law.96 Others argue there must be a
monitor the expenses energy companies incur in performing the contract. See
Timor-Leste Model Production Sharing Contract Under the Petroleum Act, art.
16, http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetRegime/PSC /20model /20270805.pdf
[hereinafter Timor-Leste Model Production Sharing Contract] (establishing a
committee consisting of representatives of the home state ministry and the
contractor which oversees budgets, work orders, etc.); Egyptian Natural Gas
Holding Company "EGAS," 2012 International Bid Round: Main Contract
Terms and Conditions, 15 (on file with author) (contemplating that budgets
for a project awarded under the bid process will be governed by a joint
committee of the government and the contractor for eventual approval by the
relevant ministry). A production sharing agreement used in energy projects is
an arrangement whereby a host country allows an investor to develop a region
to produce oil and gas in exchange for a share of the oil and gas sold. The host
country retains title to undeveloped oil. INT'L INSTITUTE FOR ENV'T AND DEV.,
supra note 42, at 21.
93. Article 10 of the Timor-Leste Model Production Sharing Contract, supra
note 92, sets the price of oil as of the time when delivered to the place of export.
Thus, the price of the commodity itself is able to change. However, the ultimate
percentage of petroleum shared between the parties remains fixed. Id. at art.
7.1.
94. Some investment contracts appear akin to the long-term, intertwined
contracts addressed in relational contract theory, in which there might be an
expectation of period extra-judicial and judicial adjustments to the contract or
contracts that govern that relationship. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
95. Recall that a taking is legal if it is done for a public purpose, in a non-
discriminatory way, with compensation to the investor.
96. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 425 26.
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distinction in remedies based on legality, since otherwise there
would be no distinction between legal and illegal behavior and
the deterrent effect of the law would be weakened.97 As a result,
some contend that when a taking is legal, fair market value as
of the time immediately before the taking became known should
be awarded and when it is illegal, fair market value including
increases in value up to the time of the judgment should go to
the investor.98 Others find that anticipated profits should be
awarded when a taking is legal, but should not be available
when it is not.99 Some tribunals have awarded full compensation
including anticipated profits without regard to legality.10 0 For
breaches of other investment obligations, tribunals have found
that full compensation including lost profits is the appropriate
measure, in such cases often referring to the law of state
responsibility as set out in the Articles on State Responsibility
as the basis for that standard.10 1
An investor might agree that the remedies for an illegal
taking should be greater than the remedies for a legal taking,
but all things being equal, it seems more likely that an investor
would view the issue differently: it would prefer to receive, at a
minimum, an amount necessary to recover its investment
irrespective of the legality of the taking or the obligation
breached,10 2 and would likely accept any award over that
97. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 65. The issue should not be
taken lightly since it is so closely tied to the rule of law, in which a remedy exists
for every wrong. See FISCHER, supra note 3, at 1 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1765)).
98. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 86 87. Timing does not
always turn on legality or illegality. In ADC Affiliates v. Hungary, the tribunal
awarded compensation as of the date of judgment because the value of
expropriated assets in question had increased since the expropriation. See ADC
Affiliates v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, 499 (Oct.
2, 2006). In the tribunal's view, this was necessary to restore the claimants to
the position they would have been in had there been no expropriation. Id. 497.
99. See RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 9.
100. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 536 (1998) (reporting that the vast majority of
decisions before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal have awarded full
compensation irrespective of the legality of the taking).
101. See, e.g., Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guat., ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, 244 (June 29, 2012) (stating that the Articles on
State Responsibility require full reparation for breach of the minimum standard
of treatment under CAFTA); Arif v. Republic of Mold., ICSID Case No.
Arb/11/23, Award, 560 (Apr. 8, 2013) (affirming that the Articles on State
Responsibility require full compensation for breach of a fair and equitable
treatment provision in a bilateral investment treaty).
102. Arguably, the claimant has already priced unlawful acts through its
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amount. An investor would therefore likely ask for full
compensation in all situations. Charles Brower and Jason
Brueschke observe that claimants before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal have asked for such compensation regardless of
the legality of the taking.10 3 Interestingly, claimants have
tended not to ask for punitive damages.u4 This might be because
the law appears well-settled that punitive damages are
unavailable, so claimants are not inclined to ask, but it might
also be because claimants are less concerned with deterring
future takings or vindicating wrongs than with recovering their
investment. Indeed, if more recovery is available for illegal
takings, this creates an odd incentive for investors to prefer
states that engage in illegal, as opposed to legal, takings.
From the perspective of the host state, paying less
compensation is preferred, since any compensation standard
raises the cost of its policy decisions. As discussed, in theory, if
the standard is full compensation equal to fair market value
(including profits earned through the life of the project), a host
state's position does not change post-taking because the value
gained (including any surplus enjoyed by the investor) is offset
by the costs of compensation. To tip the balance in favor of a
taking, returns must exceed the value of the investment,
perhaps through network effects, and the returns here often are
not represented by value of the project alone, but includes
intrinsic gains such as furthering macroeconomic or national
sovereignty goals. A full compensation standard would allow the
state to enjoy those gains while making the investor whole.
However, as explained in Part III, unless the full compensation
standard can be adjusted, it does not allow the state to prevent
potential windfalls that come from an investor's pre-investment
risk mitigation strategies. Furthermore, if the state does not
have enough resources to compensate the investor (assuming
compensation must be prompt), the full compensation standard
would prevent the state from engaging in activities that might
result in those gains. Since the appropriate compensation
standard would permit less than full compensation to be paid,
that standard would obviously enable the state to engage in
gainful activities. This would sometimes be at the expense of the
calculation of expected returns and pre-investment strategies.
103. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 100, at 507 08. Such claimants
provide that such a remedy is available under the treaty that establishes the
tribunal and under customary international law. Id.
104. Id. at 477.
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investor, however. This could be justified on utilitarian grounds,
but other investors would be expected to take notice and require
the state to pay more for their investments. Note that
throughout this discussion, the legality or illegality of the taking
matters only insofar as it leads to a difference in the amount of
compensation.
With respect to compensation for other breaches, the
concern that the expansion of obligations owed to investors
restricts host states' ability to regulate their economies and
address environmental issues is not new. Most of that debate
appropriately centers on the substance of such standards. Still,
it is obvious the remedy for their breach is not an irrelevant
question. Remedies are presumably available in case of states'
failure to give fair and equitable treatment, denial of justice,
failure to provide effective remedies, disappointment of
reasonable expectations, and actions tantamount to a taking. If
these rise to the level of international obligations, the full
compensation standard equal to fair market value and expected
profits often applies. The concern is whether that standard
would deter states from engaging in beneficial activities, or in
the case of breach, overcompensate the investor for any injury
suffered. As might be expected, much of this turns on how one
values such injuries and on the posture of the investor when it
makes a claim, among the issues to which this Article now turns.
D. STANDARDS OF COMPENSATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The debate over standards of compensation and their
application is most keenly felt when there is a dispute between
the host state and the investor. Tribunals are criticized for their
lack of consistency in both their selection and application of
these standards.1°5 As for valuation, decision makers receive
harsh reviews for lacking financial expertise, failing to explain
their reasoning in determining values, and resorting to rules of
thumb such as splitting-the-difference-to the detriment of
investor-state dispute resolution's legitimacy.10 6 At its core, if
105. See, e.g., John Y. Gotanda, Recovering Lost Profits in International
Disputes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61, 61 62 (2005) (analyzing inconsistencies in
awarding profits); Irmgard Marboe, Compensation and Damages in
International Law: The Limits of "Fair Market Value," 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT
& TRADE 723, 723 (2006) (stating that "judgments and awards often lack
sufficient reasoning or consistency").
106. For a discussion of the threat this inconsistency poses to the legitimacy
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compensation for takings and remedies for breach are designed
to place the investor in the position it would have been had the
state not taken the investment or breached an obligation with
respect to it, tribunals face a difficult conceptual problem of
predicting what the world would have been had the state not
acted. Additionally, given concerns about overcompensation and
undercompensation as well as the other policies that motivate
that law, it is not surprising there is variation as those rules are
applied in individual cases.
At the outset, however one weighs judicial or arbitral
decisions as evidence of international law,107 the trend in
investment disputes has been to apply a full compensation
standard or its equivalent, particularly if a taking is found to be
illegal or the state is found to have breached some international
investment obligation. Thus, the remainder of this discussion
will focus on the full compensation standard and the way the
issues discussed in this Article might appear as that standard is
applied at the valuation stage.
108
The valuation of investments is a large discipline unto itself
and it is impossible to do it justice in the limited space here.10 9
A useful starting point is the commentaries to the Articles on
of the dispute resolution system, see Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-
State Arbitration: Toward a More Exact Science, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196,
208 218 (2012).
107. See Eric De Brabandere, Arbitral Decisions as a Source of International
Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 245, 246 47 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere
eds., 2012) (arguing that arbitral precedents are an "important but subsidiary
source of international investment law"); SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 429
(explaining that the decisions of arbitral tribunals should be given little weight
in establishing international norms).
108. Ursula Kriebaum and August Reinish argue that the actual valuation
technique used in a proceeding is more important than what compensation
standard is chosen. Ursula Kriebaum & August Reinisch, Property, Right to,
International Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 ((Ridiger Wolfrum ed., 2009), http://opil.ouplaw.com/
home/EPIL. See also Maarten H. Muller, Compensation for Nationalization: A
North-South Dialogue, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 37 (1981) (arguing that
because valuation is difficult, "compensation standards cannot be captured
under such rubrics as 'adequate,' 'appropriate,' just,' 'equitable,' or 'fair"'). In
contrast, Sornarajah says that the debate should remain at the choice of
standard, not valuation. SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 450 ("Methods of
valuation should not be the means by which the tail is made to wag the dog.").
109. For recent studies, see MARK KANTOR, VALUATION FOR ARBITRATION:
COMPENSATION STANDARDS, VALUATION METHODS AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
(2008); MARBOE, supra note 10; BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND
RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
(2011).
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State Responsibility.110  The commentaries observe that
compensation for loss falls under two main categories: capital
value and loss of profits.1" Loss to capital is often assessed by
its fair market value and fair market value itself is assessed
according to the nature of the asset involved.1 1 2 The task is
relatively straightforward if there are comparable assets on the
open market; it becomes more complicated if a business is
privately held.11 3 With regard to businesses, the attempt is to
value the company's assets and to allow for good will and
profitability as appropriate.11 4 Another method for evaluating
capital loss is net book value, the difference between the
company's assets and liabilities as they appear on its books.
1 15 If
the business is not a going concern, sometimes "dissolution"
value is used. This is the value of the assets if the company is
broken up and the assets are sold separately.1 16 Lost profits may
arise prior to the taking, between the taking and the
adjudication, and after adjudication, and are available
depending on the circumstances. However, they are not awarded
if they cannot be established as a legal right and are subject to
standard damage limitations such as foreseeability and
certainty.11 7 In general business litigation, as a rule of thumb,
loss in capital or business value (including loss of future
110. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23
June 1, July 2 Aug. 10, 2001); GOAR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
[hereinafter Commentaries]. For discussion of valuation techniques in
international law, see also Marboe, supra note 105, at 736 42 (discussing
valuation methods); RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 9, at 181 259.
111. Commentaries, upra note 110, art. 36, Commentary 21. Incidental
expenses are another category of damages. Id.
112. Id. 22.
113. Id. The goal is to estimate the value the business would have realized
in an arm's length transaction. It is:
an amount that a willing buyer would normally pay to a
willing seller after taking into account the nature of the
investment, the circumstances in which it would operate in
the future and its specific characteristics, including the
period in which it has been in existence, the proportion of
tangible assets in the total investment and other relevant
factors pertinent to the specific circumstances of each case.
WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 8, art. IV(5).
114. Commentaries, upra note 110, art. 36, Commentary 23.
115. Id. 24.
116. Id. 25.
117. Id. 28 32.
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earnings and good will) is appropriate when the business has
been destroyed as a result of another's actions. If the business is
not destroyed, lost profits are more appropriate. A combination
of the two is payable when a business has been impaired for a
period of time and then eventually is destroyed.
118
The pre-investment risk assessment and risk mitigation
and allocation strategies that companies and host states employ
raise at least three issues when it comes to valuation: timing of
valuation, consideration of political risk before breach, and the
award of lost profits.
1. Timing
Recall that the value of assets is calculated as of the time
immediately before a taking or breach, or in some cases at the
time of adjudication. Suppose that prior to beginning a project,
an investor and host state estimate that the project will be worth
$1 million at year ten. In year ten, the project is expropriated
and the investment is found to be worth $1.5 million. Under the
current rules, the investor will receive the $500,000 surplus as a
matter of course. But should it? That depends on who is
primarily responsible for that surplus. The argument in favor of
the investor is that, but for its capital, the surplus would not be
possible. In addition, the investor company takes the downside
business risk, so it should be able to enjoy the upside benefit.
Yet, Sornarajah and others argue, in some cases, the increase in
value of the investment is better understood as a windfall. For
example, an unforeseen reduction in the supply of oil in another
part of the world could suddenly make an investment in a host
state far more valuable. Sornarajah questions whether the
investor should be entitled to the full value of the investment
under such circumstances.11 9
This argument concerning windfalls is a specific example of
the more general debate discussed earlier on the extent to which
an investor and host state's pre-investment risk allocations
should influence an award. In the example, the investor has
118. See Elizabeth A. Evans et al., Developing Damage Theories and Models,
in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 4.1,
4.17 (Roman L. Well et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012); Kenneth M. Kolaski & Mark Kuga,
Measuring Commercial Damages via Lost Profits or Loss of Business Value: Are
These Measures Redundant or Distinguishable?, 18 J.L. & COM. 1, 4-5 (1998).
119. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 39, 75. See also Muller, supra note
108, at 68 69 (laying out the arguments for recouping "windfalls").
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presumably priced its reliance and has taken risk management
measures with a view towards having an asset worth $1 million
in year ten. The state has likely incurred costs as well on the
assumption that the project will be worth that much.
120
Awarding the full $500,000 to one party would raise issues of
unjust enrichment at the expense of the other. Under such
circumstances, a strategy such as splitting-down-the-middle
begins to look less arbitrary than it does at first glance.
2. Pre-Investment Risk Strategies More Generally
As just discussed, the issue of timing is a variation of the
more general concern that an investor might be
overcompensated if a decision maker does not take the parties'
pre-investment risk assessment and allocations into account.
Courts and tribunals sometimes do take those allocations into
consideration in rough terms. If, for example, an investor
underestimates or ignores possible risks prior to investing, the
investor can be said to have assumed such risks, in a sense
contributing to whatever loss it has suffered.121 However, this
does not happen in a systematic way, particularly when fair
market value is assessed through a discounted cash flow
analysis. As mentioned in Part III, the textbook way to account
for political risk or other risks associated with a particular
project is to adjust the amount of expected cash flows;
nonetheless, companies often factor such risks into the discount
120. If the investment's value at the time of the taking is less than the pre-
investment estimate of value, the same problem of distributing the loss arises
and will be based on who is responsible for it. If the state is responsible for the
loss in value, the recovery will likely be based on an estimate of what the value
of the investment would have been but for the state's action or omission.
121. Article 39 of the Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, provides
that when determining reparations, "account shall be taken of the contribution
to the injury by willful or negligent action or omission of the injured State or
any person or entity in relation to whom reparation is sought." In Azurix Corp.
v. Argentina, the tribunal denied an investor's claim to be compensated for the
price it had paid via a bidding process for a water and sewage concession. In the
tribunal's view, the claimant's bid had been too aggressive. It argued that a
reasonable investor would have realized that, given the tariffs that were being
charged for the service and the limitations on how much those tariffs could be
increased, the price for the concession would have been recoverable only
through an expansion of the system and improvements in efficiency. Azurix
Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 426 29 (July 14,
2006). See also Impreglilo S.p.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
Award, 364, 374-75 (June 21, 2011) (criticizing an investor's pre-investment
forecasts about the value of a concession as being too optimistic).
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rate. When the discounted cash flow method is used to calculate
fair market value, some respondents have asked that the
discount rate be increased to reflect political risk so that the
valuation will be lower.122 Sometimes the issue does not appear
to be raised.
123
One case comes close to addressing these concerns about
discount rates. In LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina,24 the
respondent was found in breach of various obligations under a
bilateral investment treaty with respect to investors in a number
of gas distribution companies. The respondent had abrogated a
tariff regime that was to serve as the principal source of income
122. For example, in Kardassopoulos u. Georgia, the respondent was found
to have breached a treaty obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to
investors who were to construct and operate an oil pipeline. At the valuation
stage, a discounted cash flow analysis was used to calculate the fair market
value of the joint venture and concession associated with the project. Claimants
and respondent argued about the extent to which the discount rate should be
increased to reflect political risk, and the tribunal held for the claimants'
discount rate. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and
ARB/07/15, Award, 624 31 (Mar. 3, 2010). In some circumstances, a lower
valuation could result in higher compensation for the claimant. In Sempra
Energy Int'l v. Argentina, the tribunal was required to determine how much an
investment in gas distribution companies would have been worth had Argentina
not instituted a series of economic measures during the crisis of 1998 2001, so
that it could award the difference between that value and the value of the
investment after those measures had been taken. Sempra Energy Int'l v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007). The tribunal
considered whether the discount rate should be increased to reflect the fact that
the premium for government bonds issued by Argentina was high because the
bonds were in default. Id. 432. It decided not to do so, in part because it had
been established that the country risk premium used by investors in private
companies at the relevant ime was lower than Argentina's credit risk premium.
The tribunal also reasoned that, given the regulatory structure for gas
distribution that would have been in place had the measures not been taken,
the claimants would have been shielded to some extent from the greater crisis.
Id. 433. Finally, although the tribunal conceded that, had the claimants sold
the investment during the crisis, "investors might very well have applied an
extremely high discount rate and undervalued the equity." Id. 435. However,
the tribunal did assess the impact the crisis had on the tariffs charged on gas
and on gas consumption. Id. TT 437 50.
123. In Alpha Projektholding GMBH u. Ukraine, the claimant and
respondent agreed to use the discounted cash flow method to measure the fair
market value of assets associated with the renovation and operation of a hotel.
Alpha Projektholding GMBH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award
(Nov. 8, 2010). The tribunal agreed with the claimant's discount rate, which was
the weighted average cost of capital based on the debt-to-equity ratio of the
hotels and motels category for emerging markets as set out in a commercial
reporting service. Id. 482. There is no indication either claimant or respondent
adjusted the discount rate for political risk.
124. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award (July 25, 2007).
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for the businesses. At the damages stage, the respondent
claimed that a country risk premium had already been factored
into the calculation of the tariffs; thus the claimants had already
been compensated for that risk, presumably through higher
tariffs while the regime had been in place.12 5 The tribunal
acknowledged that a premium had been factored in, but rejected
the argument hat compensation should be reduced to account
for it. The tribunal reasoned that the tariff regime had
"additional conditions than those covered by the country risk
premium." 126 It was also persuaded by the claimant's rejoinder
that acknowledging the respondent's arguments "would result in
the absurd situation that high-risk borrowers would be excused
from their international responsibility."
1 27
The tribunal's reasoning has merit, but it only serves to
highlight the tension that arises between business practice and
the aims of the law. To take the borrowing analogy further, there
are high-risk borrowers, but there are high-risk lenders as well.
To elaborate on a point made earlier in Section A of this Part,
such lenders mitigate that risk through various forms of credit
enhancement: higher interest rates, third-party guarantees, and
insurance. Here, higher interest rates in the form of higher tariff
rates for gas was one of the mechanisms chosen, so that while
the tariff regime was in place, the investors were in fact being
paid more to invest in a risky business environment. At the same
time, the respondent had in fact breached international
obligations. Under international law the very finding of
international responsibility is a form of sanction, so even if no
reparations are awarded, a state would not be absolved of
responsibility. It would still be of little comfort to the injured
party, unless it has already been compensated in the form of





128. Notably in the LG&E case, the claimants only prevailed in part.
Claimants asked for the full fair market value of their shares in the three gas
companies in which they invested. That value was to be based on the sale price
of their publicly traded shares for two public companies and on comparable
sales for the third (which was privately held). Id. 14. The tribunal rejected
this argument because, in its view, the abrogation of the tariff regime had
depressed the level of dividends payable to shareholders but had not destroyed
the value of the shares. Thus, it based its award on the amount of dividends
that would have been received but for the abrogation. Id. 47 48. The tribunal
also found that future dividends could not be paid because they were too
speculative. Id. 90.
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3. Lost Profits
Recall that the Articles on State Responsibility provide that
''compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage
including loss of profits insofar as it is established,"129 and that
in the business context this refers to a business's capital value
and profits. These two types of damages roughly match Roman
law concepts of damnum emergens, a measure akin to reliance,
and lucrum cessans, the loss of expected gains. As Mark Kantor
notes, though, modern valuation techniques, such as the
discounted cash flow method, do not map readily onto these
traditional concepts.1 30 It appears well understood among
commentators that if the standards are misapplied, there will be
double counting. This is because the discounted cash flow
method used to calculate value is based on the cash flows that
will be generated throughout the life of the investment, which
includes what might be understood as profit.1 31 The solution is
to award either the loss in value or lost profits, but not both, or
award the two, but use some method to ensure that there is no
overlap.1 32 As commentators observe, however, tribunals have
not always been sensitive to the issue.
1 33
129. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, art. 36.
130. See KANTOR, supra note 109, at 198 99.
131. See id. See also MARBOE, supra note 10, at 102 07; SABAHI, supra note
109, at 126 27; Commentaries, upra note 110, art. 36 cmt. 26; Louis T. Wells,
Double Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An Economist Questions Damages
Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT'L 471 (2003).
Kantor explains:
An Income-Based Approach like a DCF forecast calculates
the net present value of all cash flows an equity investor will
receive, including the component of those cash flows that
constitutes a recovery by the investor of invested capital
(sunk investment costs) as well as the component that
constitutes a return on that equity capital (gross profits to
the investor). If the arbitrator awards recovery of the
invested capital as damnum emergens and also separately
awards the net present DCF amount as lucrum cessans, the
investor's recovery will double count the invested capital.
KANTOR, supra note 109, at 199.
132. KANTOR, supra note 109, at 200; MARBOE, supra note 10, at 106 07.
133. One case in particular, Karaha Bodas Co. v. Pertamina, has been
criticized on this ground. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), Award (Dec. 18, 2000). The Award
is available as an Exhibit to Petition to Confirm Arbitral Award and to Enter
Judgment in Favor of Petitioner, In re Arbitration between Karaha Bodas Co.
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There may be another limitation on profits. As discussed in
Part III, even though the practice is waning, a significant
number of companies still use heuristic financial techniques
such as the payback period method when deciding whether to
invest. Imagine a company that uses this method estimates that
it will take five years to recoup its investment and decides to
invest on that basis alone. Imagine again that the company's
prediction is correct, and the project does generate enough cash
flow to pay for the investment within the first five years. After
the seventh year, the host state breaches an obligation with
respect to the investor so that the project is impaired, but not
completely destroyed. Can the state argue that it does not need
to pay the company's loss in profits, because from the company's
ex ante perspective, it has been more than compensated for its
investment already by receiving two more years' worth of cash
flow than was sufficient to cause it to invest in the first place?
By using the payback method, the investor has by definition
ignored the cash flows, let alone the profits that would be earned
after the end of the payback period. So the question arises why
any compensation should be paid at all, since the investor has
already been compensated for those assets during the payback
period, and this was the basis upon which the investor decided
to invest in the first place.
The company would argue that the five-year period of cash
flow only represented the floor for its investment decision-of
course it had hoped the project would generate more. If the
company has investments elsewhere, it needs projects like this
one that over-perform to offset those that underperform. But
everything depends on the facts. To return one last time to the
concerns raised earlier, if the investor insisted that it receive the
lion's share of cash flow vis-A-vis the host state to ensure that
v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 190 F. Supp. 2d
936 (S.D. Texas 2001). The case involved a foreign-owned contractor hired to
construct and operate a power plant. The resulting electricity would be sold to
an Indonesian state-owned company. Due to an economic downturn, the
Indonesian company cancelled its contract with the contractor. Prior to the
cancellation, the contractor had invested a nominal amount into the project in
comparison to the project's size, and the power plant was not yet operating. The
case went to ad hoc arbitration, where the tribunal found that the Indonesian
company had breached its contract. It awarded the investor a multiple of the
amount it had invested in the property and, in addition, lost profits of $150
million. Louis Wells argues that the tribunal likely overcompensated the
claimants by awarding the amount of the original investment with no
adjustment, plus the net present value of the expected cash flows. See also
Wells, supra note 131, at 473 77.
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the investment did pay for itself in five years, in a sense the
investor has already insured itself against the state's breach.
These competing factors explain, at least in part, the
variation in results by tribunals. To be sure, tribunals can
benefit from further training in financial valuation methods to
avoid conceptual errors that lead to great costs to the investor or
to the host state. But on the other hand, valuation will always
be less of a science and more of an art because of the different
ways compensation, damages, and their relationship to one
another are understood and justified. Recall Marboe's
observation that an international practice has developed
without vindicating any one of the several justifications urged
for the requirement to compensate.134 However, the fact that no
theory has been vindicated does not mean that those theories do
not inform decision makers as they craft remedies and value
assets. This Article has argued that the pre-investment risk
assessments of the investor and host state have some bearing on
the standard of compensation used and the valuations of assets
because investors and host states, viewed as economic actors,
might have already provided in advance for possible losses and
might not care about distinctions between compensation and
damages. Given that there are cross-cutting issues at play, it is
not surprising that there will be variation in the way awards are
calculated.
V. CONCLUSION
There may be many reasons for the division in the
international community over what standard of compensation
should be used when a host state takes an investment or when
it breaches an obligation owed to an investor, as well as the
criticisms about the uneven way in which the standard is
applied. This Article has asked what implications the investor's
and host state's behavior might have on those standards and
their application. Before there is an investment, investors and
host states who wish to maximize the benefits of that investment
appear to engage in a number of quantitative and qualitative
risk assessments and allocation strategies that range from
sophisticated analyses to rules of thumb. The result often is that
the host state bears the cost of political risk in one way or
another. This risk allocation raises the possibility of
134. MARBOE, supra note 10, at 14 15.
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undercompensation or overcompensation once there is a dispute.
This Article has also argued that a desire to maximize the
benefits of an investment would influence the way the standard
of compensation is chosen or embodied in individual contracts,
treaties, and customary international law. Since it is unlikely
that any one rule best meets the needs of even a majority of
investors and host states from an efficiency standpoint, it would
be surprising if either rule would emerge as the clear winner.
States would be expected to try to adopt a standard that would
preserve as much flexibility as possible, which would be afforded
by the appropriate compensation standard. In a similar vein, it
probably would not matter to an investor whether a taking is
legal or illegal, or whether an award is characterized as
compensation for a legal taking or as damages for an
internationally wrongful act so long as it recoups the loss caused
by the host state's actions. Finally, the pre-investment behavior
of investors and host states should affect the way the full
compensation standard, the one most commonly used, is applied.
That the full compensation standard is so often used could
be seen as further confirmation that the law and the
international community (including host states) that created it
are concerned with more than the preferences of the main actors
in investment transactions when those transactions are viewed
as purely business matters. However, those other concerns do
not make the possibility of mispriced compensation disappear.
Given the large sums of money often at stake and the fact that
many host states have limited resources to meet their
responsibilities to both investors and their own citizens, it is
worth paying at least some attention to the issues discussed
here.
